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Abstract
Poor nutritional status, especially during childhood, has a negative impact on one’s early life as well as throughout
their life. One of the factors that influences the improvement of children’s nutritional status is the bargaining power
of the mother. Previous studies have limitations in that they often use cross-sectional data and indirect approaches
to measuring bargaining power. This study aims to measure the impact of maternal bargaining power on children’s
nutritional status in Indonesia. The unit of analysis is children aged 7–19 years (IFLS5) who still have and live with their
parents (IFLS4). Using the OLS estimation method, the results show that maternal bargaining power significantly and
positively influences the nutritional status of children (HA z-score).
Keywords: bargaining power; OLS; nutritional status; HA z-score
JEL classifications: D70; I15; J16

1. Introduction
One of the factors that determines the success of
development and the competitiveness of a country
is the quality of its human resources, in terms of
both capability and productivity. A country rich in
natural resources but without the support of quality
human resources will face difficulties in achieving
its full potential. Therefore, ensuring qualified human resources is central to supporting the success
of development and competitiveness of a country.
The nutritional adequacy of every human being
is one of the factors that determines the quality
of human resources. Poor nutritional status, especially during childhood, has a negative impact
on one’s early life and throughout their life. Therefore, increasing the nutritional status of children as
economic successors is imperative for Indonesia
∗ Corresponding

Address: Demographic Institute, Faculty of
Economics and Business, Universitas Indonesia. Nathanael
Iskandar Building Fl. 2 & 3 Universitas Indonesia Campus, Depok 16424. Email: dewawisa@ui.ac.id.

to improve the quality of its human resources. A
healthy child is an investment in human capital, as
the nutritional status of children in the present can
determine the quality of their life in the future. Victora et al. (2008) found that poor nutritional status
in childhood has a negative impact on children’s
health and development in the future, including cognitive development disorders, reduced economic
productivity, increased risks related to maternal reproduction such as maternal mortality or giving birth
to underweight babies, and increased risk of noncommunicable diseases. Reviewing studies on the
relationship of stunting and malnutrition in childhood
with economic outcomes in adulthood, McGovern et
al. (2017) concluded that children who are stunted
or malnourished will suffer negative effects on various economic outcomes such as productivity, employment opportunity, and wages.
The indicators of the nutritional status of children
in Indonesia remain concerning. This can be seen
from the number of children with malnutrition in Indonesia which is above the maximum limit set by
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the World Health Organization as shown in Figure
1 (Ministry of Health 2019). This calls for serious
efforts to improve the nutritional status of children
in Indonesia. One important factor in the nutritional
status of children is the parents of the children themselves, especially the mother because traditionally
it is the mother who is responsible for the domestic
affairs such as taking care of the children, while the
father is expected to earn money for the family. The
role of mothers in the effort to raise healthy children
with a good nutritional status can be in the form
of household decisions commonly referred to as
bargaining power or maternal autonomy. Previous
studies have shown that maternal bargaining power
has a relationship with the nutritional status of children (Dasgupta 2016; Debnath & Bhattacharjee
2016; Imai et al. 2014; Kamiya et al. 2018; Kunto &
Bras 2018; Lépine & Strobl 2013; Patel et al. 2007;
Rajaram et al. 2017; Shroff et al. 2009; Sinha et
al. 2017) and other indicators of children’s health
such as child health care (Grabowski & Self 2013),
child immunization coverage (Ebot 2015), and the
risk of child mortality (Adhikari & Sawangdee 2011;
Hossain 2015; Memiah et al. 2019).
These studies have limitations in that they use
cross-sectional data, whereas nutritional status, especially stunting, is an accumulation of nutritional
status from the previous period. In addition, bargaining power is a process (Hossain 2015), making
measuring its causal relationship with the nutritional
status of children or other indicators of children’s
health using cross-sectional data less precise (Adhikari & Sawangdee 2011; Ebot 2015; Kamiya et
al. 2018; Lépine & Strobl 2013; Memiah et al. 2019;
Sinha et al. 2017). The use of longitudinal data,
on the other hand, will result in more precise measurement of this relationship and enable the study
of the long-term impact on the nutritional status of
children throughout their life (Ebot 2015; Lépine &
Strobl 2013; Memiah et al. 2019). This study aims
to investigate the impact of maternal bargaining
power on the nutritional status of children in Indonesia. The results of this study are expected to extend
the literature on maternal bargaining power in im-

proving the quality of children’s nutrition, especially
in Indonesia.

2. Literature Review
2.1. Concepts and Definitions
Nutritional status is a condition that reflects the
health of a person’s body which can be measured
or assessed as a result of the consumption, absorption, and utilization of food substances, so it
can be seen whether or not a person has a good
nutritional status. One way to assess and predict a
person’s nutritional status is using anthropometry
or by measuring a person’s body. Anthropometry
result is presented in the form of an index using
measures/variables such as height, weight, age,
and upper arm circumference. Because it is more
helpful to evaluate child growth and nutritional status as an adult, the variables of height and weight
are often used in anthropometry. There are three
indices in determining a person’s nutritional status
based on these variables, namely weight according
to height (WH), weight according to age (WA), and
height according to age (HA). In this study the authors use the HA index (stunting) as the nutritional
status of children because it is an accumulation of
nutritional status from the previous period so that
the development of the nutritional status of children
between surveys can be traced using longitudinal
data. The authors also use the z-score to calculate the HA index because it is a commonly used
method to express a person’s HA index.
While maternal bargaining power or also called autonomy, status, position, or role (Beegle, Frankenberg & Thomas 2001; Bloom, Wypij & Gupta 2001;
Dyson & Moore 1983) is defined as the mother’s
ability to influence decisions about herself or the
immediate household members, to control economic and information resources, and to move
freely (Bloom, Wypij & Gupta 2001; Dyson & Moore
1983). Anderson & Eswaran (2009) argue that maternal autonomy is usually defined as the ability of
the mother to make choices/decisions in the house-
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Figure 1. Prevalence of Malnutrition in Indonesia (percent)
Source: Basic Health Research (Riskesdas) 2018, Ministry of Health (2019)

hold relative to her husband. Direct indicators of
maternal autonomy include the role of the mother in
household decision making as measured by the extent to which she is involved in household decision
making. The more decisions made by the mother in
a household, the higher the maternal autonomy or
bargaining power in the household. Although several studies have shown that maternal bargaining
power has a positive impact on improving children’s
nutritional status, these studies have limitations, as
they often use indirect proxies to measure bargaining power. Commonly used proxies revolve around
measures of maternal economic ownership such as
income, prepaid income (pension, insurance claims,
or savings interest), inheritance, assets received
from marriage (dowry), and current assets (Browning et al. 1994; Quisumbing 1994; Schultz 1990;
Thomas 1990). There is a new direct indicator that
can be used to measure bargaining power (Kishor
2000), namely through several questions such as
who makes decisions in the household regarding resource control and other decision-making aspects.

2.2. Theoretical Framework
Although this study focuses on the mother’s decision as a result of the mother’s bargaining power,
it is possible that the father’s decision also has an
effect, at least on how many decisions the mother

makes. Therefore, the theoretical arguments will
discuss the extent to which maternal bargaining
power influences children’s nutritional status based
on the intrahousehold bargaining model as summarized by Imai et al. (2014). There are several
assumptions in this model, namely (1) children are
a public good for both parents; (2) children are not
the decision makers in the household, but parents
care about the nutritional status of their children
by making decisions for themselves respectively;
and (3) each parent chooses consumption with their
respective preferences to maximize the children’s
nutritional status as an effort to maximize utility
(Maitra 2004; Park 2007). For example, a household consists of a mother (m), a father (f) and a
number of children (n), xj is the consumption of
both parents (j = m, f) and g is the (average) nutritional status of the children. Then, the utility of
the j person is defined as Uj = (xj , g|Aj ), where Aj
is the extra-household environmental parameters
(EEP), namely a vector consisting of exogenous
factors that determine individual preferences j. In
this model, the household utility function is defined
as θUm (xm , gm ; Am ) + (1 − θ)Uf (xf , gf ; Af ) where
θ represents the bargaining power of the mother
in a household (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). To maximize their utility through the nutritional status of their children,
both parents are faced with obstacles in the form
of household income. Therefore, the problem of
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maximizing household utility can be formulated as
follows:
max UH

xm ,xj ,g

= θUm (xm , gm ; Am )
+(1 − θ)Uf (xf , gf ; Af ) s.t.
I = pm xm + pf xf + pc g

(1)

Where I is the household income, pj is the commodity price for the mother or father, and pc is the
shadow price of the public good in this case the
children, while g is the children’s nutritional status
which is a function of gm (nutritional status of children based on the mother’s perception) and gf (nutritional status of children based on the father’s perception) or g = f(gm , gf ). The Lagrangian equation
that can be formed from the maximization problem
is:
L

=

θUm (xm , gm ; Am ) + (1 − θ)Uf (xf , gf ; Af )
+λ[I − pm xm − pf xf − pc f(gm , gf )]

(2)

From the above equation, a decision variable (g∗)
can be made to maximize utility which is a function
of all exogenous variables, in this case variables
θ, Am , Af , I, pm , pf and pc .
g∗ = f(θ, Am , Af , I, pm , pf , pc )

(3)

The focus of this research is how maternal bargaining power affects the nutritional status of children.
However, Equation (3) cannot explain the causal
relationship between the bargaining power of the
mother and the nutritional status of the children
( ∂g∗
∂θ =?), be it positive, negative or no relationship.

2.3. Previous Research
Several studies have investigated the effects of maternal bargaining power on the nutritional status of
children. However, their results remain inconclusive
due to the differing measurement methods (i.e., bargaining power of the mother, nutritional status of the
child, and estimation method) used in each study.
Studies that found a strong, positive relationship between maternal bargaining power and children’s nu-

tritional status include Dasgupta (2016), Debnath &
Bhattacharjee (2016), Kunto & Bras (2018), Lépine
& Strobl (2013), Rajaram et al. (2017), and Sinha et
al. (2017). Bargaining power in these studies was
measured by asking the extent to which a mother
participates in the household decision-making process regarding the purchase of household daily
necessities, children’s health, cooked food, and so
on (Dasgupta 2016; Lépine & Strobl 2013; Rajaram
et al. 2017). Other studies (Debnath & Bhattacharjee 2016; Kunto & Bras 2018; Sinha et al. 2017)
use several indicators to measure bargaining power
such as control over income, household level decision making, personal level decision making, respect for the mother in the household, freedom of
movement, maternal education, and employment
status or economic independence of the mother. For
the variable nutritional status of children, these studies use the WH index z-score (Dasgupta 2016), mid
upper arm circumference (Lépine & Strobl 2013),
and HA and BMI (Kunto & Bras 2018). Because
these variables use numerical data, the three studies use the OLS estimation method. Other studies
use logistic regression analysis by categorizing the
nutritional status of children into stunting (Sinha et
al. 2017), and underweight and wasting (Debnath
& Bhattacharjee 2016; Rajaram et al. 2017).
Some of these studies provide reasons justifying
the use of certain variables for maternal bargaining power. For example, an indicator of freedom
of movement that makes it easier for the mother
to go to the market more freely without having to
ask the husband’s permission to buy good food for
their children, not just the type of food to be cooked,
can be used as a proxy for maternal bargaining
power. Likewise, indicators of control over income
and employment status or economic independence
of the mother means that she is not dependent on
income or money given by her husband to spend
on something related to the children’s health.
Several other studies found mixed effects, that is,
some bargaining power measurements have a positive effect on the nutritional status of certain children, but other measurements are not statistically
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significant (Imai et al. 2014; Kamiya et al. 2018;
Shroff et al. 2009), or even have a negative effect on the nutritional status of children (Patel et
al. 2007). Measuring bargaining power can be done
using various methods, for example by asking the
two partners about who makes the decision on
the type of food to be bought or cooked (Patel et
al. 2007), or using several indicators such as the
mother’s educational attainment relative to the father, domestic violence/self-esteem, whether the
wife (mother) needs permission from her husband
to travel/freedom of mobility (Imai et al. 2014), decision making power and financial autonomy (Shroff
et al. 2009), as well as access to health services
and loans/self-efficacy (Kamiya et al. 2018). The
variable nutritional status of children has been
measured using various metrics, including stunting (Kamiya et al. 2018; Shroff et al. 2009), and
underweight and wasting (Imai et al. 2014). Because these studies categorized the nutritional status of children, they use logistic regression analysis.
Meanwhile, other studies use OLS and multinomial
logit estimation methods because they use BMI in
the form of z-score and underweight criterion (Patel et al. 2007). One of the reasons why maternal
bargaining power has not significantly or negatively
affected the nutritional status of children is the high
matrilineal system in the study area compared to
other areas that restrict mothers from traveling.
Findings from previous studies regarding the influence of maternal bargaining power on the nutritional
status of children remain inconclusive; therefore,
this study aims to further test the hypothesis already
tested in the previous empirical studies. Bargaining
power measurement in this study uses the same
method as in the research conducted by Dasgupta
(2016), Lépine & Strobl (2013), Patel et al. (2007),
and Rajaram et al. (2017), while the measurement
of nutritional status and estimation methods follow
Dasgupta (2016), Kunto & Bras (2018), Lépine &
Strobl (2013), and Patel et al. (2007), where most of
them proved that maternal bargaining power had a
positive effect on children’s nutritional status. Therefore, the hypothesis in this study is that maternal

119

bargaining power is positively related to the nutritional status of children, meaning that when the
mother has high bargaining power by playing an
active role in household decision making, the nutritional status of the child as measured by the HA
z-score is also high.

3. Method
In this study the authors use secondary
data—longitudinal data derived from IFLS waves 4
and 5 (2007 and 2014). IFLS contains questions
or variables relevant to this study, such as health
indicators to determine the nutritional status of
children, information on maternal bargaining power,
and other socio-demographic variables used as
control variables to support this study. The unit of
analysis in this study is children aged 7–19 years
old in IFLS5 who in the IFLS4 period still had and
lived with their parents. Their HA index in the form
of a z-score was then used. Maternal bargaining
power was observed in the IFLS4 period when the
children were 0-12 years old. The assumption is
that children aged 0-12 years are still under the full
supervision of both parents, so that the bargaining
power of the mother plays an important role in that
age period.
The maternal bargaining power in this study is
defined as how much role the mother plays in
the effort to raise children with a good nutritional
status through her decisions in the household. Of
the 18 questions in IFLS, the authors chose 10
questions assumed to be related to the health
(nutritional status) or needs of children in general.
These questions are related to (see Appendix 1):
(1) Expenditure for food eaten at home (A1); (2)
Choosing the type of food eaten at home (A2);
(3) Daily household expenses such as purchasing
cleaning tools and the likes (B); (4) Expenditure for
children’s clothing (E); (5) Children’s education (F);
(6) Children’s health (G); (7) Purchasing expensive
household equipment such as refrigerator, TV, and
so on (H); (8) Amount of money saved every month
(M); (9) Is it the father/mother who works (P); and
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Figure 2. Unit of Research Analysis
Source: IFLS

(10) Does the father/mother use contraception (Q).
The questions were answered by only the respondent (father/mother), father and mother together,
and other people including respondents with other
household members. However, according to the assumptions based on the theoretical framework used
in this study, parents are the only decision makers
in the household. Therefore, only the decisions of
the father and mother will be discussed. If the answers from each respondent (i.e., mother or father)
to these questions are expressed in one measure
with equal weighting, then the mother’s bargaining
power (θ) will be taken as 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. 0 indicates
that the mother’s bargaining power is weak (i.e., no
decisions are made by the mother), and 1 indicates
that the mother’s bargaining power is strong (i.e.,
all decisions are made by the mother).
In addition, based on the theoretical framework
and previous research, other control variables were

used in the form of parental characteristics such as
work status; education, operationalized as years of
schooling; height, to see the genetic factors from
both parents; the father’s bargaining power; child
characteristics such as gender, age, and number of
siblings; household characteristics such as household income and household asset ownership; and
other environmental or EEP characteristics such as
the number of posyandu in the village, classification
of residence, and area (island). The price variable
is not used because of the limited data used in this
study.
To achieve the objectives of this study, the
authors use an inferential analysis with the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation method.
The model generated from this method was
used to describe the level of influence each
independent variable has on the dependent
variable through its parameter coefficient.

haz_child14 = β0 + β1 barg_mom07 + β2 work_mom07 + β3 educ_mom07 + β4 height_mom07
+β5 barg_dad07 + β6 work_dad07 + β7 educ_dad07 + β8 height_dad07
+β9 sex_child14 + β10 age_child14 + β11 sibling_child07 + β12 income_hh07
+β13 asset_hh07 + β14 posyandu07 + β15 urban07 + β16 java07 + εi

(4)
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Table 1. Operational Definition of Variables in Research
Variable name
Nutritional status of children
Mother ‘s characteristics
Bargaining power of mother
Working status

Education
Height
Father’s characteristics
Bargaining power of father
Working status

Operational definition
Symbol
Dependent variable (Y)
HA z-score of children
haz_child14
Independent variable (X)

Scale category

Data source

numerical

us06, us04 IFLS5

Proportion of maternal decisions in
the household
Mother’s work status for the past
week

barg_mom07

numerical

pk18 IFLS4

work_mom07

1: working

ar15c IFLS4

educ_mom07
height_mom07

0: not working*
numerical
numerical

ar16, ar17 IFLS4
us04 IFLS4

barg_dad07

numerical

pk18 IFLS4

work_dad07

1: working

ar15c IFLS4

educ_dad07
height_dad07

0: not working*
numerical
numerical

ar16, ar17 IFLS4
us04 IFLS4

sex_child14
age_child14
sibling_child07

1: male
0: female*
numerical
numerical

us03 IFLS5
bk_ar1 IFLS4

income_hh07
asset_hh07

numerical
1: has

b1_ks IFLS4
b2_hr1 IFLS4

-

0: does not have*

posyandu07

numerical

j26 IFLS4

urban07
java07
-

1: urban
0: rural*
1: Java
0: other than Java*

sc05 IFLS4

Mother’s years of schooling
Mother’s height (cm)

Proportion of paternal decisions in
the household
Father’s work status for the past
week

Education
Height

Father’s years of schooling
Father’s height (cm)

Child characteristics
Gender

The sex of the child

Age
Number of siblings

Child age based on last birthday
Number of siblings still living together

Household characteristics
Household income
Ownership of household assets

Household expenditure per month
Ownership of household assets in
the form of a house, car, motorcycle,
TV, refrigerator, etc.

Environmental characteristics
Number of posyandu
Number of posyandu in the village
where the family lives
Classification of residence
Urban-rural status of residence
Classification of area (island)

Residence area based on island

us01 IFLS5

sc01 IFLS4

Source: IFLS, compiled
Note: *) Reference category

4. Result
4.1. Descriptive analysis
The sample in the study is 2,044 children with 1,410
pairs of parents. The mean HA z-score of the 2,044
children was -1.378 with a standard deviation of
1.012 (see Table 2). The 1,410 pairs of parents
were asked questions about their household decision making as the authors explained in the previous section. A comparison of the decision-making
roles between the mother and father in the house-

hold showed that of the ten types of decisions, the
mother was always dominant in all types of decisions, except for the decision to buy expensive
household equipment and the decision regarding
the employment status of the father/mother. However, there was quite a large difference between
the decisions made by the mother and father regarding expenditure on food eaten, choosing the
type of food eaten, and household daily expenses.
This shows that the holder of responsibility related
to daily needs was still in the hands of the mother,
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while those related to large expenses or other types
of decisions the difference between the mother and
father was not too significant. Moreover, related to
expenses for buying expensive household equipment, the father was more dominant because the
decision to work was more dominated by the father.
The results of the calculation of parental bargaining
power showed that there were still quite a number
of mothers (as many as 380 people/18.59 percent)
who were not involved at all in making full household decisions (0 decisions). On the other hand, the
mothers with the highest bargaining power (involved
in 9 decisions) were only 4 people (0.20 percent),
and the highest number was 0.3 (581 people/28.42
percent). The scatter plot of the children’s HA zscore and the maternal bargaining power shows a
flat pattern or no slope. This means that descriptively the HA z-score of children is not influenced
by the high or low bargaining power of the mother.

4.2. Inferential Analysis
In this analysis, the authors use a robustness check
model with three models. Model 1 contains independent variables in the form of individual characteristics (parents and children), household characteristics, and one EEP variable in the form of the
number of posyandu in one village. This is done to
examine the effect of maternal bargaining power on
the nutritional status of children when it is regressed
together with other independent variables at the individual, household, and environmental levels in a
small scope (i.e., village). In Models 2 and 3, the
environmental coverage (area) used is made wider,
namely the classification based on urban-rural and
classification based on Java and non-Java islands.
This is done because descriptively the HA z-score
of children living in urban areas or on the island
of Java was relatively higher than that of children
living in rural areas or outside the island of Java.
Models 1 and 2 showed consistent significance for
this variable of interest, namely maternal bargaining
power. However, in Model 3, where the variable of
residence area classification based on islands was

added, the bargaining power of mothers and the
number of posyandu became insignificant. It can
be concluded that the classification of residential
areas based on islands can eliminate the influence
of maternal bargaining power and the number of
posyandu on the HA z-score of children in Indonesia. Therefore, the interpretation of the model in this
inferential analysis focuses on Model 2.
The results of the overall test (F-test) show that
there is sufficient evidence to reject H_0 because
the value of Prob > F is smaller than α = 0.05.
Thus, it can be concluded that all the independent
variables together are able to explain or influence
the dependent variable in this study, namely the
children’s HA z-score. Meanwhile, the goodness
of fit test, which can be seen from the R-squared
value of 0.223, show that the independent variables
explain 22.3 percent of the variance of the children’s HA z-score. Of all the independent variables,
there is no strong linear relationship among the independent variables, or commonly referred to as
non-multicollinearity. This can be seen from the VIF
value, no greater than 10 or tolerance (1/VIF) less
than or equal to 0.01 (see Appendix 2).
The results of the partial test (t-test) show that the
main independent variable in this study, namely maternal bargaining power, significantly and positively
affected the nutritional status of the children as measured by the HA z-score (α = 0.10). The parameter
coefficient of 0.175 means that the children’s HA
z-score will increase by 0.175 standard deviation
as the maternal bargaining power increases by one
unit, or the HA z-score of children in 2014 would
have increased by 0.0175 standard deviation if the
level of participation of mothers in household decisions in 2007 had increased by one decision, assuming other variables were ceteris paribus. The
results of this study are in accordance with the hypothesis and several previous studies (Dasgupta
2016; Debnath & Bhattacharjee 2016; Kunto & Bras
2018; Lépine & Strobl 2013; Rajaram et al. 2017;
Sinha et al. 2017). There are several reasons that
explain the results of this study. First, mothers are
the primary caregivers of their children, and the
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Figure 3. Types of Household Decisions by Decision Maker (percent)
Source: IFLS, compiled

Figure 4. Scatter Plot Between Child’s Z-score HA and Maternal Bargaining Power
Source: IFLS, compiled

quality of care for children is one of the three main
determinants of their nutritional status, in addition to
household food security and healthy environment.
Second, maternal bargaining power has an indirect
effect because it can affect the health and nutritional
status of the mother herself, both of which are central to proper care for children from pregnancy to delivery (Smith et al. 2003). Third, mothers and fathers
appear to have differences in allocating income. Fa-

thers tend to use a larger proportion of their income
for production, household maintenance, social investment, and personal consumption, while mothers use more of the income to meet daily consumption, such as food, clothing, and health care (Lele
1986). Other studies have also shown that fathers
and mothers have different preferences in allocating resources; for mothers managing resources is
more important than just the number of resources
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Table 2. Summary of research variable statistics
Variable
Average
haz_child14
-1,378
barg_mom07
0,279
work_mom07
0,441
educ_mom07
6,77
height_mom07
150,958
barg_dad07
0,071
work_dad07
0,943
educ_dad07
7,394
height_dad07
161,291
sex_child14
0,493
age_child14
12,574
sibling_child07
1,622
income_hh07
3.788.867
asset_hh07
0,592
posyandu07
7,285
urban07
0,494
java07
0,642
Source: IFLS, compiled

Std. Deviation
1,012
0,196
0,497
4,513
5,099
0,127
0,231
4,677
10,436
0,5
3,302
1,339
1.284.591
0,492
5,317
0,5
0,48

(Vijaya, Lahoti & Swaminathan 2014). Compared
to their partners, mothers are more likely to spend
the family resources on nutrition, education, and
health-related commodities (Fantahun et al. 2007;
Quisumbing & Maluccio 2003; Thomas 1990).
Other parental characteristics, namely the father’s
bargaining power and the mother’s work status
were not found to be statistically significant in influencing the HA z-score of the children. However, the
father’s work status showed the opposite in that it
significantly and positively affected the HA z-score
of the children (α = 0.01). The parameter coefficient was 0.209, which means that the difference
in the HA z-score between children with working
fathers and non-working fathers was quite large,
0.209 standard deviation. The education variable of
both parents operationalized as years of schooling
was found to significantly and positively influence
the HA z-score of the children (α = 0.05 for mothers
and α = 0.01 for fathers). The parameter coefficient
of maternal education is slightly lower than that of
the father (0.012 vs. 0.016), which means that one
additional year of parental education (i.e., mother
and father) will have a positive effect on increasing
the HA z-score of children by 0.012 and 0.016 standard deviation, respectively. A likely explanation is
that paternal work status and parental education
will increase the opportunity to provide better nu-

Min
-8
0
0
0
127,2
0
0
0
156
0
7
0
206.041
0
0
0
0

Max
3,42
0,9
1
16
171,2
0,8
1
18
182
1
18
9
20.583.790
1
46
1
1

trition for the children, prevent diseases, or meet
other needs related to the children’s health, as well
as broaden parents’ knowledge about child development. From the genetic factors operationalized
as the height of the parents, the results were similar.
Both the height of the mother and father positively
and significantly influenced the HA z-score of the
chilren with parameter coefficients of 0.060 and
0.017, respectively (α = 0.01). This means that
each additional 1 cm height of the mother and father will increase the HA z-score of the children by
0.060 and 0.017 standard deviation, respectively.
From these results, it can also be seen that the
genetic influence of the mother, operationalized as
the mother’s height, is more dominant in influencing the HA z-score of the children compared to the
genetic influence of the father, operationalized as
the father’s height.
All the variables related to the child characteristics
were significant in explaining the variance of the
children’s HA z-score, both sex (α = 0.05), and age
and number of siblings (α = 0.01). The parameter coefficient for the gender variable was 0.086,
meaning that the difference in the HA z-score between boys and girls was 0.086 or in other words,
the nutritional status of boys was better than that of
girls. Conversely, the parameter coefficient for the
variable age of the child showed the opposite; it had
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Table 3. Comparison of Regression Models Based
on the Number of Independent Variables
Independent
Variable
konstanta
barg_mom07
work_mom07
educ_mom07
height_mom07
barg_dad07
work_dad07
educ_dad07
height_dad07
sex_child14
age_child14
sibling_child07
income_hh07
asset_hh07
posyandu07

Model 1
haz_child14
-13,640***
(0,663)
0,178*
(0,102)
-0,042
(0,041)
0,015***
(0,006)
0,060***
(0,004)
-0,118
(0,160)
0,176**
(0,087)
0,019***
(0,005)
0,018***
(0,002)
0,083**
(0,040)
-0,016**
(0,006)
-0,042**
(0,018)
3,40 x10-7**
(1,57x10-7)
0,167***
(0,041)
0,014***
(0,004)

urban07
java07

Model 2
haz_child14
-13,600***
(0,659)
0,175*
(0,102)
-0,03
(0,041)
0,012**
(0,006)
0,060***
(0,004)
-0,081
(0,159)
0,209**
(0,086)
0,016***
(0,005)
0,017***
(0,002)
0,086**
(0,040)
-0,016***
(0,006)
-0,054***
(0,018)
3,31x10-7**
(1,56x10-7)
0,168***
(0,041)
0,008*
(0,004)
0,211***
(0,045)

Model 3
haz_child14
-13,730***
(0,660)
0,151
(0,102)
-0,028
(0,041)
0,011**
(0,006)
0,060***
(0,004)
-0,141
(0,160)
0,224***
(0,086)
0,016***
(0,005)
0,017***
(0,002)
0,085**
(0,040)
-0,016**
(0,006)
-0,048***
(0,018)
3,54x10-7**
(1,56x10-7)
0,149***
(0,041)
0,005
(0,004)
0,213***
(0,045)
0,121***
(0,044)
2.044
0,225

N
2.044
2.044
R-sq
0,214
0,223
Source: Authors’ estimation
Note: *** significant at α = 0.01; ** significant at α = 0.05;
and * is significant at α = 0.10

a negative effect on the HA z-score of the children
with a value of -0.016. This means that a one-year
increase in the age of the child is followed by a decrease of 0.016 standard deviation in the children’s
HA z-score. This is because child development is
very much determined during childhood, where the
growth in that period is very fast. On the other hand,
there are also many cases of malnutrition during
this age period so that as children age, their HA
z-score will likely decrease. Likewise, the number
of siblings was found to have a negative effect on
the HA z-score of children with a parameter coefficient of -0.054. This means that each additional
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sibling can reduce the child’s nutritional status by
decreasing the HA z-score by 0.054 standard deviation. This is in line with the economic theory related
to the quantity and quality of children, whereby parents are faced with a choice (trade off) to maximize
their utility and to prioritize either quantity or quality of children, which includes children’s nutritional
status (Becker & Lewis 1973).
The results pertaining to household characteristics
showed that both income and asset ownership had
a positive and significant effect on the HA z-score
of children (α = 0.05 for income and α = 0.01 for asset ownership). The parameter coefficient for each
variable was 3.31 x 10-7 for income and 0.168 for
asset ownership. This means that the HA z-score
of children will increase by 0.0331 standard deviation when the household income increases by IDR
100,000 per month. Children who live in households with assets will have a HA z-score of 0.168
standard deviation higher than children who live in
households without assets. This seems reasonable
because high income and ownership of household
assets will facilitate the provision of better nutrition
and other needs related to children’s health as well
as prevention or cure of diseases.
Regarding the environmental characteristics, the
number of posyandu in one village and the classification of residence (urban-rural) both showed the
same results in influencing the HA z-score of children, which was positive and significant (α = 0.01
for urban-rural status and α = 0.10 for the number of posyandu). The parameter coefficient for
urban-rural status was 0.211 and the number of
posyandu was 0.008. This means that the difference in the HA z-score of children living in urban
areas is 0.211 standard deviation better than children living in rural areas. This is perhaps due to
better health infrastructure and facilities in urban
areas so that meeting children’s good nutritional
needs and preventing diseases are much easier
than in rural areas. As for the number of posyandu,
when the number of posyandu increases by 1 unit in
one village, the HA z-score of children will increase
by 0.008 standard deviation. Posyandu is a com-
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munity center that offers periodic health services.
It tracks the status of children’s growth and development, conducts an initial screening to prevent
growth disorders, and provides guidance to mothers regarding the nutritional intake for the children.
Therefore, the existence of posyandu is important
in supporting the improvement of the nutritional status of children in Indonesia. This of course also
depends on the awareness and active role of the
mothers themselves to take their children to the
posyandu.

5. Conclusion
Of the ten types of household decisions included
in the study, mothers have been found to be more
dominant in making household decisions than fathers. However, when viewed as a whole from
the bargaining power of mothers in the household,
there were still quite a number of mothers (380
people/18.59 percent) who were not involved at all
in making full household decisions (0 decisions).
Based on the inferential analysis, it can be concluded that the bargaining power of the mother has
a positive impact on the nutritional status of children as measured by HA z-score. However, the
other independent variables provide mixed results.
For example, the father’s bargaining power and the
mother’s work status were found to be not statistically significant in affecting the nutritional status
of children. The characteristics of children in terms
of age and number of siblings are variables that
have a negative impact on children’s nutritional status. On the other hand, the variables of the father’s
work status, education and height of parents, and
household income have a positive impact on children’s nutritional status. Furthermore, seen from
the dummy variable, it can be concluded that boys
living in a household that has assets and living in
urban areas will have a better nutritional status than
girls living in a household that has no assets and
living in the countryside.
Extra attention is needed to increase the bargaining
power of mothers in the household, for example

by providing mothers with the opportunity to participate more in the household, not only in foodrelated matters or daily expenses, but also giving
them more control of household resources/income,
high respect in the household, space to express
their opinions, and others in an effort to improve
the quality of the children, specifically the nutritional
status of children. In addition, the bargaining power
of mothers in the household can increase as their
knowledge increases. Therefore, the mother’s socialization process with the surrounding community, neighbors, or friends can be very important
because with socialization, mothers can exchange
ideas about household matters. Future research
should also investigate the role of mothers in influencing other aspects related to children’s quality, for
example education, cognitive development, future
employment opportunities, or household welfare in
general. The limitation of this study concerns the
use of data with a long time interval between survey
periods (i.e., 7 years). This means that this study
cannot capture what happened during the 7-year
interval. Therefore, further research is expected to
use survey data with a shorter time interval to produce more reliable results. However, the authors
believe that the results of this study can enrich the
literature on bargaining power of mothers through
their decisions in the household as an effort to improve the quality of children’s nutritional status.
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Appendix 2. Model 2 Regression Results
. eststo: reg haz_child14 barg_mom07 work_mom07 educ_mom07 height_mom07 barg_dad07
work_dad07 educ_dad07 height_dad07 sex_child14 age_child14 sibling_child07 income_hh07
asset_hh07 posyandu07 urban07
Source |
SS
df
MS
----------------+---------------------------------Model | 465.377791
15 31.0251861
Residual | 1625.13202
2,028
.80134715
----------------+---------------------------------Total | 2090.50981
2,043 1.02325492

Number of obs
F(15, 2028)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

2,044
38.72
0.0000
0.2226
0.2169
.89518

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------haz_child14 |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95\% Conf. Interval]
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------barg_mom07 |
.1752699
.1018886
1.72
0.086
-.0245474
.3750872
work_mom07 | -.0300806 .0411691
-0.73
0.465
-.1108187
.0506574
educ_mom07 |
.0116552
.0055492
2.10
0.036
.0007726
.0225378
height_mom07 | .0597839 .0039634
15.08
0.000
.0520111
.0675567
barg_dad07 | -.0811804 .1592081
-0.51
0.610
-.3934088
.2310481
work_dad07 |
.2086415
.0864074
2.41
0.016
.0391851
.3780979
educ_dad07 |
.0156043
.0053038
2.94
0.003
.0052028
.0260059
height_dad07 | .0170306 .0019293
8.83
0.000
.013247
.0208142
sex_child14 |
.0864855
.0397856
2.17
0.030
.0084606
.1645104
age_child14 | -.0165337 .0061332
-2.70
0.007
-.0285618
-.0045057
sibling_child07 | -.0534888 .0175465
-3.05 0.002
-.0878999
-.0190776
income_hh07 |
3.31e-07
1.56e-07
2.12
0.034
2.49e-08
6.36e-07
asset_hh07 |
.1680549
.0410729
4.09
0.000
.0875055
.2486043
posyandu07 |
.0077451
.0040337
1.92
0.055
-.0001655
.0156557
urban07 |
.2114543
.0446875
4.73 0.000
.1238161
.2990925
_cons |
-13.5982
.6591711
-20.63
0.000
-14.89093
-12.30548
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------(est2 stored)
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Model 2 non-multicollinearity test

. vif
Variable |
VIF
1/VIF
----------------+---------------------educ_mom07 |
1.60
0.625539
educ_dad07 |
1.57
0.637455
urban07 |
1.27
0.785395
posyandu07 |
1.17
0.852676
work_mom07 |
1.07
0.938402
age_child14 |
1.05
0.956251
sibling_child07 |
1.04
0.957264
height_mom07 |
1.04
0.960206
asset_hh07 |
1.04
0.962145
barg_dad07 |
1.04
0.965169
height_dad07 |
1.03
0.967598
income_hh07 |
1.02
0.978087
work_dad07 |
1.02
0.980923
barg_mom07 |
1.02
0.983384
sex_child14 |
1.01
0.990927
----------------+---------------------Mean VIF |
1.13
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